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CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

public employees, even those in positions not peculiarly governmental,
have no right to strike against their employer nor to picket in support of
such a strike, a decision bound to have a restrictive affect on future
attempts to strike by public employees. While public employees may still
make grievances known to their employer through their union, this decision does indicate that perhaps the only effective means available to
public employee unions of enforcing their demands for better working
conditions and salaries is through organized efforts to effect legislation
in their interests.
ROBERT J. JOHNSON

EQuITY-INJUNCTION-UNVERIFIED

COMPLAINT

HELD

INSUFFICIENT

TO

SUPPORT A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ORDER.-In Phelan v. Wright, 54 Ill.

App. 2d 178, 203 N.E.2d 587 (1st Dist. 1964), the Illinois Appellate.Court
was confronted with the problem of whether an unverified complaint, not
supported by a verified petition or affidavit, was sufficient to support the
issuance of a temporary injunction. The court held that it was an abuse
of the trial court's discretion to issue a temporary injunction on an unverified complaint.
In the Phelan case, the plaintiffs filed their unverified complaint for
an injunction, alleging that the defendant was in violation of certain
provisions of a partnership agreement, to which the defendant was a
party. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
After hearing arguments of counsel on the merits of defendant's
motion to dismiss, the trial court denied the motion and ordered that the
temporary injunction issue. The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal
to the Illinois Appellate Court. On Appeal, held: Reversed. Verification
is a fudamental requirement for a complaint seeking a temporary injunction and defendant's motion to dismiss neither disposed of this requirement nor amounted to a waiver of it. The court reasoned that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion and in issuing the
temporary injunction.
It has long been settled that the granting of temporary injunctions
is largely a matter of the trial court's discretion,' and that great caution
must be exercised. 2 The reviewing court must consequently determine
whether the trial court properly exercised its discretionary powers. In the
1 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Vee Jay Records, Inc., 47 Ill. App. 2d 468, 197 N.E.2d 503
(lst Dist. 1964); H.K.H. Development Corp. v. The Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Chicago,
47 Il1. App. 2d 46, 196 N.E.2d 494 (1st Dist. 1964); Weingart v. Weingart, 23 Ill. App. 2d
154, 161 N.E.2d 714 (1st Dist. 1959).
2 Peterson v. Domestic Utility Services Co., 33 Ill. App. 2d 374, 179 N.E.2d 444 (lst
Dist. 1961).

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

case of Sunset Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Karel,s the Illinois Appellate
Court said:
.... The primary purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve
the status quo for further proceedings, and unless the reviewing
has abused his discretion, the
court finds that the Chancellor
4
order will not be set aside.
Due to the extraordinary character of the injunctive remedy it is essential
that the face of the complaint clearly show the need for the remedy. In
order to establish this need, the facts upon which the injunction is sought
must be alleged with certainty and precision, and verification on information and belief is insufficient. 5 Thus, where application for a preliminary
injunction is made on the face of the complaint, it is necessary that the
complaint must be verified by affidavit.6
Having decided that verification is essential where the complaint,
on its face, seeks a temporary injunction, the Illinois Appellate Court next
turned to the question of whether the defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint disposed of the requirement of verification or amounted to a
waiver. The plaintiffs contended that verification was unnecessary and immaterial since the defendant admitted the truthfulness of the allegations
contained in the complaint by his motion to dismiss. This line of reasoning was used in the case of Decker v. West 7 where the plaintiff similarly
sought to restrain the defendant from violating provisions of a partnership agreement. In that case the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the
issuance of an injunction stating that:
Under the authorities, by filing his demurrer, appellant thereby
admitting all the well pleaded facts, it was immaterial whether the
verification was sufficient or insufficient.8
However, in Villareal v. Trevino,9 the Illinois Appellate Court has
recently held that under modern practice a motion to dismiss does not
serve as a binding admission of the allegations contained in the complaint.
The court said:
A motion to strike a pleading for want of sufficiency admits the
facts averred for the purpose of the motion and no more. Plaintiffs would have us treat it as if it were a judicial admission, binding throughout the case. All such a motion does is to assert hypothetically that if all the facts set forth in the complaint are accepted as true, they still do not state a cause of action. 10
3 39 I1. App. 2d 477, 189 N.E.2d 41 (1st Dist. 1963).
4 Id. at 485, 189 N.E.2d at 45.
5 Hope v. Hope, 350 Ill. App. 190, 112 N.E.2d 495 (1st Dist. 1953), following Fox v.
Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc., 349 Ill. App. 132, 110 N.E.2d 84 (1st Dist. 1953).
6 Haxton v. Haxton, 333 Ill. App. 223, 77 N.E.2d 208 (1st Dist. 1948).
7 273 Ill. App. 532 (2d Dist. 1934).
8 Id. at 539.
9 30 Ill. App. 2d 77, 173 N.E.2d 582 (1st Dist. 1961).
10 Id. at 83, 173 N.E.2d at 585.
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In the instant case, the Illinois Appellate Court viewed the Villareal
case as controlling and held that the defendant's motion to dismiss was
an admission of the allegations contained in the complaint for the purpose
of argument only. Plaintiff's complaint charged that the defendant was
and continues to be in a position to divert business from the plaintiffs.
The defendant could not be considered to have admitted the verity of
such an allegation by his motion to dismiss.
By its decision in the Phelan case, the Illinois Appellate Court continues to assert that the discretionary power possessed by the trial court
in granting temporary injunctions is not to be controlled by technical
legal rules. However, the court has wisely held that verification of the
complaint by affidavit or petition is one technical rule that the chancellor
cannot overlook. The exercise of injunctive power requires great caution
and deliberation and should not be exercised in doubtful cases. Therefore, it is necessary that the complaint for a temporary injunction clearly
show a prima facie need for such relief. In Phelan, the court justifiably
held that it is essential to such a showing that the allegations contained
in the complaint be supported by a verified petition or affidavit.
EUGENE K. FRIKER

CRIMINAL

LAW-SUPPRESSION

OF EVIDENCE-THE

OWNER

OF

LEASED

PROPERTY DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO OBJECT TO THE USE OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH OF THE LEASED PROPERTY
NOR

Is

HE

EXEMPT FROM

ESTABLISHING

STANDING

UNLESS

THE

OFFENSE

the recent
case of People v. DeFilippis, 54 Ill. App. 2d 137, 203 N.E.2d 627 (1st Dist.
CHARGED IS UNLAWFUL

POSSESSION

OF THE GOODS SEIZED.-In

1964), the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the owner of leased
property did not have "standing" to object to the use of evidence which
was obtained as a result of an illegal search of the leased property in
violation of the Constitution.' The court also held that the only exception
to the rule, requiring a defendant to establish his "standing" before he
can object to the use of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search
and seizure, arises when the proof of possession of the seized goods would
also contribute proof of the crime charged.
In the DeFilippis case, FBI agents, acting without a warrant, entered
a garage, arrested four of the defendants, and seized radios which were
alleged to be stolen property. The fifth defendant, DeFilippis, was later
1 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Ill. Const. art. II § 6 is substantially the same.

